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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a dispute between an excess insurer and a 
reinsurer over who should pay for defense litigation costs 
arising out of asbestos injury claims against the underlying 
insured.  Under procedures established by the Wellington 
Agreement, a comprehensive agreement between asbestos producers 
and insurers designed to resolve disputes over coverage,1 an 
                     
1
.  The Wellington Agreement represented an innovative effort by 
asbestos producers and their insurers to solve the asbestos 
litigation crisis.  The Agreement established a non-profit claims 
handling center that coordinated claim payments on behalf of 
producers.  It also contained provisions that aimed to avoid 
coverage disputes between producers and their insurers and 
established arbitration procedures to adjudicate claims the 
participants could not settle.  For a detailed discussion of the 
Wellington Agreement, see discussion infra at part II. 
  
arbitrator ruled that North River Insurance Company was obligated 
to pay defense costs, in excess of policy limits, to its insured, 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, an asbestos manufacturer.  
North River then sought indemnification from its reinsurer, CIGNA 
Reinsurance Company, for the defense costs it paid to Owens-
Corning.2   
 In these cross appeals we must decide whether four 
facultative reinsurance certificates issued by CIGNA Re to North 
River obligate CIGNA Re to indemnify North River for defense 
costs.  We also must decide whether actions taken by North River 
in connection with its participation in the Wellington Agreement 
violated its duty of good faith, and whether the district court 
erred by refusing to reconsider its judgment to include, as an 
alternative basis for summary judgment, that a reinsurance 
certificate's indemnity limit caps the amount a reinsurer is 
obligated to pay under the policy.   
 The district court granted summary judgment to CIGNA 
Re, holding defense costs were not covered under the reinsurance 
certificates and North River violated its duty of good faith.  
North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 831 F. 
Supp. 1132, 1153 (D.N.J. 1993).  The district court denied 
summary judgment to North River finding factual disputes 
                     
2
.  CIGNA Re has paid more than $30 million in indemnity payments 
under the several reinsurance certificates it issued to North 
River.  On the four facultative reinsurance certificates at issue 
here, North River contends CIGNA Re owes approximately $13 
million plus interest in defense costs.  North River Ins. Co. v. 
Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1132, 1136-37 
(D.N.J. 1993).   
  
involving North River's rejection of a settlement with Owens-
Corning and North River's notice to CIGNA Re about the 
arbitration proceeding. Id. at 1147-48, 1153.   
 We believe the coverage of defense costs was reasonably 
within the terms of the North River-Owens-Corning insurance 
policies as reinsured.  We also believe the district court erred 
in holding that North River breached its duty of good faith to 
its reinsurer.  We find, as a matter of law, that CIGNA Re cannot 
show that North River's decision to enter the Wellington 
Agreement violated its duty of good faith.  But we find disputed 
issues of material fact exist on the questions of North River's 
good faith in failing to schedule its policies under Wellington 
and its rejection of the settlement proposal.  
 Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant 
of summary judgment to CIGNA Re and reverse the denial of summary 
judgment to North River on all points except the question of bad 
faith relating to North River's failure to schedule and its 
rejection of the settlement proposal.  On remand, consideration 
of the question of bad faith shall be limited to asking (1) 
whether CIGNA Re has established that North River breached its 
duty of good faith in failing to schedule its policies, and (2) 
if the disputed evidence relating to North River's rejection of 
the settlement proposal manifests a breach of North River's duty 
of good faith to its reinsurer.  We also hold the district court 
properly denied the motion for reconsideration because CIGNA Re 
failed to raise the indemnity cap defense in the course of the 
proceedings below and because Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. 
  
North River Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Unigard 
III"),3 did not change existing law.   
 I. 
 Before we discuss the parties' contentions, some 
background is useful.  Primary insurers, excess insurers, and 
reinsurers play different roles in the insurance industry.  Both 
primary and excess insurers provide coverage directly to the 
insured policy holder.  Primary insurance policies describe what 
kinds of liability will be covered and specify dollar limits.  
Excess insurers typically track the coverage offered by the 
primary insurer and also specify dollar limits, but the excess 
insurer's liability is not triggered until the primary insurer's 
limit is exhausted.  Reinsurers do not provide coverage directly 
to the insured but issue certificates of reinsurance to the 
excess or primary insurer, also specifying dollar limits. 
                     
3
.  The district court referred to the Second Circuit's opinion 
as "Unigard II."  We will call it "Unigard III," however, because 
it is the third published opinion concerning the same matter.  
Initially, Unigard, the reinsurer, brought an action in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a 
declaratory judgment relieving it of any obligation to indemnify 
the reinsured excess insurer, North River.  Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. 
v. North River Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
("Unigard I"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 
1993).  After judgment for North River, Unigard appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  That court certified a 
question to the Court of Appeals of New York, which held that a 
reinsurer must demonstrate prejudice and may not rely on a 
presumption of prejudice to prevail on a late loss notice 
defense.  Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 594 
N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. 1992) ("Unigard II").  The Second Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the 
district court.  Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 
F.3d 1049, 1071 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Unigard III"). 
  
 Reinsurance is purchased by insurance companies to 
insure their liability under policies written to their insureds.  
See Henry T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in Reinsurance 1, 
5 (R.W. Strain ed., 1980).  Typically, an insurer who has 
provided coverage against a large loss will cede all or part of 
that risk to other insurance companies along with a portion of 
the premiums.  Ceding risk increases the insurer's capacity to 
insure other customers and decreases the likelihood that insurer 
insolvency will result from any large claim.4 
 There are two types of reinsurance contract: treaty and 
facultative.  Under a reinsurance treaty, the reinsurer agrees to 
accept an entire block of business from the reinsured.  William 
G. Clark, Facultative Reinsurance: Reinsuring Individual 
Policies, in Reinsurance, supra, at 117, 121.  Once a treaty is 
written, a reinsurer is bound to accept all of the policies under 
the block of business, including those as yet unwritten.  Because 
a treaty reinsurer accepts an entire block of business, it does 
not assess the individual risks being reinsured; rather, it 
evaluates the overall risk pool.  Id. 
                     
4
.  Reinsured risk is spread in layers with premium dollars 
allocated in greater amounts to those who have taken larger 
risks.  For example, an excess insurer who writes a $100 million 
policy might retain a certain portion of the risk, e.g., the 
first $10 million of excess liability, and reinsure the balance 
with other insurance companies.  If no claim exceeds the $10 
million retained liability, the original insurer will pay the 
entire excess claim.  If, on the other hand, a claim is made that 
exceeds $10 million, that portion of the claim exceeding $10 
million will fall on the reinsurer who has accepted the next 
layer of liability.  As layers of coverage are exhausted, the 
loss falls on successive reinsurers until the claim is satisfied. 
  
 Facultative reinsurance entails the ceding of a 
particular risk or policy.  Unlike a treaty reinsurer who must 
accept all covered business, the facultative reinsurer assesses 
the unique characteristics of each policy to determine whether to 
reinsure the risk, and at what price.  Thus, a facultative 
reinsurer "retains the faculty, or option, to accept or reject 
any risk."  Id.; see also Francis M. Gregory, Jr. & Nicholas T. 
Christakos, Primary, Excess and Reinsurance Problems in Large 
Loss Cases, 59 Def. Couns. J. 540, 543 (1992) ("[T]he 
distinguishing characteristic is always the reinsurer's right of 
individual risk rejection.").   
 The reinsurance relationship depends on the reinsurer 
and the reinsured observing high levels of good faith.  See 
Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1069.  The reinsured must keep its 
interests aligned with those of the reinsurer, see id., and the 
reinsurer must "follow the fortunes" of the reinsured, see 
Kramer, supra, at 12-13.    
 Reinsurance certificates usually employ standard forms.  
A reinsurance certificate typically includes a "following forms" 
provision that expressly limits the reinsurance to the terms and 
conditions of the underlying policy and provides that the 
reinsurance certificate will cover only the kinds of liability 
covered in the original policy issued to the insured.  The 
reinsurance certificate often, as here, also includes a "follow 
the fortunes" clause, which is somewhat broader than the 
"following forms" clause and obligates the reinsurer to indemnify 
the reinsured for any good faith payment of an insured loss. 
  
 "Follow the fortunes" clauses prevent reinsurers from 
second guessing good-faith settlements and obtaining de novo 
review of judgments of the reinsured's liability to its insured.  
See International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters 
& Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London, 868 F. Supp. 917, 
921 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("Were the Court to conduct a de novo review 
of [the reinsured's] decision-making process, the foundation of 
the cedent-reinsurer relationship would be forever damaged.").  
But while a "follow the fortunes" clause limits a reinsurer's 
defenses, it does not make a reinsurer liable for risks beyond 
what was agreed upon in the reinsurance certificate.  See 
Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 
910, 914 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Kramer, supra, at 13 ("[T]he 
concept of follow fortunes cannot create a reinsurance where none 
exists.").  In that regard, the reinsurer retains the right to 
question whether the reinsured's liability stems from an 
unreinsured loss.  A loss would be unreinsured if it was not 
contemplated by the original insurance policy or if it was 
expressly excluded by terms of the certificate of reinsurance. 
  
 A. 
 North River Insurance Company sells excess insurance.5  
Between 1974 and 1978 it sold policies to Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas, an asbestos manufacturer.  The excess insurance 
policies at issue here provided coverage for various amounts of 
loss in excess of $26 million.  Under those policies North River 
insured Owens-Corning against "ultimate net loss," which 
generally excluded "costs."  Elsewhere, however, the policies 
referred to North River's obligation to pay ultimate net loss and 
costs and described various ways that costs incurred with the 
written consent of North River would be apportioned.  The 
policies did not include a duty to defend clause, but gave North 
River the option to participate in "the control, defense and/or 
trial of any claims, suits or proceedings." 
 North River reinsured a portion of this risk with 
various reinsurers including CIGNA Reinsurance, which issued 
North River four facultative reinsurance certificates each 
containing "following forms" language, a "follow the fortunes" 
clause, and a consent clause requiring North River to obtain 
CIGNA Re's prior approval for any changes made to the policies.  
                     
5
.  North River is wholly owned by Crum & Forster Insurance 
Companies, Inc., which uses North River and other subsidiaries as 
issuing companies.  "In 1983, Crum & Forster created a unit . . . 
to coordinate and control, but not to manage, environmental and 
asbestos claims for all of Crum & Forster's insurance 
affiliates."  Unigard III, 4 F.3d, at 1057.  Accordingly, 
although North River is the named party in this dispute, some of 
the relevant acts attributed to North River actually were 
undertaken by Crum & Forster.  For example, it was Crum & Forster 
that signed the Wellington Agreement.  References in this opinion 
to North River and to Crum & Forster refer to the same entity. 
  
The reinsurance certificates did not expressly exclude coverage 
for defense costs.   
 Like all asbestos producers, Owens-Corning incurred 
high costs defending -- and paying out -- asbestos injury claims.  
By March, 1987, it had exhausted its primary insurance and sought 
coverage from its excess insurer, North River.  But North River 
claimed that under the terms of the policies issued to Owens-
Corning it was not obligated to cover defense costs.  Because 
North River and Owens-Corning had signed onto the Wellington 
Agreement, a global settlement agreement providing for 
arbitration of asbestos coverage disputes, the dispute went to 
binding arbitration.  The arbitrator found that under the terms 
of the policy itself, and according to the provisions of the 
Wellington Agreement, North River was obligated to cover Owens-
Corning's defense costs.6  After CIGNA Re refused to cover its 
share of these defense costs, North River filed suit in federal 
district court seeking to compel its reinsurer to "follow" North 
River's fortunes.  As we have noted, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the reinsurer, CIGNA Re.   
   II. 
 The Wellington Agreement figures prominently in this 
dispute and merits some discussion.  By the early 1980s, tens of 
thousands of asbestos injury claims had been filed against 
asbestos producers who were represented by more than a thousand 
                     
6
.  Under its policies North River has paid Owens-Corning more 
than $300 million in liability coverage and more than $250 
million in defense costs.  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1135. 
  
law firms nationwide.  See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for 
Claims Resolution, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 13, 14 (1990).  By 
1985, manufacturers and their insurers had paid out an estimated 
one billion dollars on asbestos injury claims -- with roughly 
half going for costs alone.  Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1055.  
Meanwhile, there was a growing backlog of unresolved claims.  Id.  
Asbestos producers, insurance carriers, and courts tried to craft 
solutions to meet this crisis.   
 In 1985, several insurers and asbestos producers 
entered into the Agreement Concerning Asbestos Related Claims.  
Known as the Wellington Agreement because of the mediation of 
then-Yale Law School Dean Harry Wellington, the Agreement 
established the Asbestos Claims Facility, a non-profit claims 
handling center that coordinated claim payments on behalf of the 
asbestos producers.  The signatories to the Agreement sought to 
reduce asbestos litigation awards while lowering the associated 
costs.  The Agreement encouraged settlements in place of costly 
litigation and established arbitration procedures to adjudicate 
claims that producers and their insurers could not settle.  North 
River's parent, Crum & Forster, and Owens-Corning signed on.  
CIGNA Re, North River's reinsurer, did not.7     
 Wellington did not rewrite existing policies between 
producers and their insurers.  Rather, the Agreement aimed to 
avoid coverage disputes by applying insurance arrangements "in a 
                     
7
.  In 1985, CIGNA Re was INA Reinsurance.  See infra note 27.  
INA Re's corporate parent, INA, was a signatory.  
  
consistent manner."  Wellington Agreement at 1.  In several 
places, the Agreement established default coverage provisions to 
cover disputes but with the caveat "unless [the policy] expressly 
provides otherwise."  See id. § XI, ¶¶ 1, 3, § XV, ¶ 5, and § 
XVIII, ¶ 1.  Similarly, in Appendix D, Wellington required the 
signatory insurers and policy holders to "schedule" their 
policies to clarify particular features of coverage.  Appendix D 
did not require insurers to provide coverage for defense costs; 
in fact, parties could agree to schedule their policies expressly 
to exclude defense costs.  In the absence of any designation, 
however, Wellington set up a presumption that defense costs would 
be covered.   
 Appendix D set out nine "schedules" or generic 
categories of coverage:  A through I.  The insurer and the 
insured were supposed to agree on which category applied to their 
policy.  For our purposes, the significant differences lie among 
categories "G," paying defense costs or "allocated expenses" 
beyond policy limits, "H," paying allocated expenses within the 
policy limits, and "I," not paying allocated expenses at all.  
But Appendix D also provided for a sanction if the insurer did 
not schedule the policy.  By failing to schedule, the insurer was 
deemed to have assented to the policy-holder's designation.   
 A.  
 Crum & Forster and Owens-Corning signed the Wellington 
Agreement on June 19, 1985.  In accordance with the requirements 
of Appendix D, each party was to execute a scheduling form for 
every policy subject to the Agreement.  Owens-Corning submitted 
  
the required form, scheduling its policies with North River as 
"G," which provided coverage for allocated expenses in addition 
to policy limits.  North River did not agree to Owens-Corning's 
scheduling, but did not register its disagreement on the 
scheduling form.  Instead of executing the required forms, North 
River, through Crum & Forster, wrote letters to Owens-Corning 
detailing what it did and did not agree to cover.  North River 
contended that its correspondence constituted a proper challenge 
to Owens-Corning's scheduling because a separate provision of the 
Wellington Agreement, Appendix B, permitted subscribing insurers 
to reserve the right to raise defenses of exclusions of defense 
obligations or payments. 
 On March 13, 1987, the Asbestos Claims Facility 
notified North River that insured claims had exhausted the 
coverage on Owens-Corning's primary insurers' policies.  Shortly 
thereafter, North River began receiving bills from Owens-Corning 
seeking indemnification for liability and reimbursement of 
defense costs.  North River paid the liability claims but denied 
coverage for defense costs. 
   In accordance with Wellington's procedures, Owens-
Corning and North River submitted their dispute to arbitration.  
They went first to non-binding arbitration, where Owens-Corning 
argued: (1) North River waived its rights to contest the policy 
scheduling, (2) North River acted in bad faith by failing to pay 
defense costs, and (3) the policies, as amended by Wellington, 
required North River to pay defense costs.  The arbitrator 
believed that, if litigated, North River could prevail against 
  
Owens-Corning's waiver and bad faith claims, but would have 
difficulty with the argument that the policy required payment of 
defense costs.  Therefore, he proposed a settlement under which 
the policies would be rescheduled as "H" -- "the insurance policy 
pays allocated expenses and such expenses apply against aggregate 
limits."   
 When Owens-Corning and North River rejected the 
proposed settlement, the matter went to binding arbitration.  On 
July 26, 1989, after a six-day proceeding, the arbitrator, 
retired United States District Court Judge H. David 
Hermansdorfer, ruled that North River was liable for Owens-
Corning's defense costs.  The arbitrator first examined North 
River's failure to comply with the scheduling requirement. He 
found that, under Wellington, insurers could properly challenge a 
policy holder's proposed schedule, but the challenge had to 
follow Wellington procedures, particularly the Appendix D 
scheduling requirement.  Judge Hermansdorfer held that the letter 
response failed to satisfy Wellington's scheduling requirements.  
Because of its failure to use Wellington's Appendix D schedule to 
assert its challenge, North River was deemed to have assented to 
Owens-Corning's "G" designation.  The arbitrator also relied on 
Wellington's presumption that, unless expressly excluded, all 
policies provided coverage for allocated costs.   
 But the arbitrator also examined the policy language, 
and found North River liable for defense costs on that basis as 
well.  He noted that the policy language did not expressly 
exclude payment of defense costs and found the policy provided 
  
for payment of costs upon consent of the insurer.  Relying on 
case law and expert testimony about industry custom, the 
arbitrator found that policy language conditioning an insurer's 
duty to pay defense costs on receipt of its prior consent 
actually meant such consent could not be withheld unreasonably.  
According to the arbitrator, the policy relieved North River of 
the obligation to pay unreasonable expenses only.  The arbitrator 
rejected North River's arguments that policy provisions relieving 
North River of the duty to assume charge of the settlement or 
defense of any claims against Owens-Corning relieved the insurer 
of the obligation to pay defense costs.  He held North River 
responsible for Owens-Corning's defense costs because it had not 
met its burden of showing that those costs were excluded from the 
policy coverage.8   
 In September and in December, 1988, North River 
solicited "any views its reinsurers may have with respect to" the 
pending arbitration.  App. at 1268-69, 1402-03.  CIGNA Re did not 
respond to these requests.  The arbitrator issued his opinion 
July 26, 1989, and North River, through Crum & Forster, promptly 
notified its reinsurers of the unfavorable arbitration decision.  
North River initially appealed the arbitrator's ruling but later 
dropped the appeal.  
  B. 
                     
8
.  See infra part III.B. for discussion of the arbitrator's 
reasoning.   
  
 CIGNA Re indemnified North River for liability under 
the policies but denied coverage for defense costs.  North River 
then filed this suit seeking reimbursement for defense costs and 
a declaratory judgment that CIGNA Re must reimburse North River 
for future costs. 
 After discovery, the parties made cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  North River claimed the reinsurance 
certificates obligated CIGNA Re to indemnify it for defense 
costs, while CIGNA Re maintained defense costs were an 
unreinsured risk.  In a comprehensive opinion, the district court 
granted summary judgment to CIGNA Re on two bases.  First, the 
court found that defense costs were not a type of risk that CIGNA 
Re had reinsured.  Second, the court found that North River had 
violated its duty of good faith.9  Accordingly, the court held 
that CIGNA Re was not bound to "follow the fortunes" of North 
River and relieved the reinsurer of liability for defense costs 
paid to Owens-Corning. 
 CIGNA Re later filed a motion for reconsideration under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), requesting the court to 
find, as an alternative basis for summary judgment, that the 
indemnity limits constituted an absolute cap on CIGNA Re's 
                     
9
.  The district court concluded that CIGNA Re had demonstrated 
two instances of bad faith sufficient to warrant the grant of 
summary judgment.  The court also found CIGNA Re had raised 
disputed issues of fact with respect to other alleged 
manifestations of bad faith and denied summary judgment to North 
River.   
  
reinsurance liability.10  The district court denied CIGNA Re's 
motion on the ground that it had not met its burden of proving 
there had been an intervening change in controlling law that 
warranted reconsideration of judgment. 
 C. 
 The parties now appeal.  The district court had 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988).11  We 
have jurisdiction of North River's appeal of the grant of summary 
judgment to CIGNA Re under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  We also have 
jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment to North 
River because the district court granted CIGNA Re's cross-motion 
for summary judgment.  See First Nat'l Bank v. Lincoln Nat'l Life 
Ins. Co., 824 F.2d 277, 281 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) 
("[A]n appellate court may remand with directions to enter 
summary judgment on appellant's unsuccessful cross-motion for 
summary judgment where there is no dispute as to the facts which 
would justify judgment for the appellant.").  We will apply 
plenary review of the indemnification and duty of good faith 
issues.  Dickler v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Co., 957 F.2d 1088, 
1094 (3d Cir. 1992) (district court's conclusion about the legal 
operation of an insurance policy is subject to plenary review); 
                     
10
.  CIGNA Re had disavowed this defense during discovery, but 
pressed it upon learning another insurer had successfully used it 
against North River in Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1057.  See 
discussion infra part VI. 
11
.  North River is a New Jersey corporation with its principal 
place of business in New Jersey.  CIGNA Re is a Delaware 
Corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.  
  
Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co. 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 
(3d Cir. 1984) (construction of legal effect of a contract 
involving no factual issues requires a determination of law and 
our standard of review is plenary).  
 Generally, the denial of a motion for reconsideration 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Koshatka v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  Where a 
district court's denial of a motion to reconsider is based upon 
the interpretation of legal precepts, however, our review of the 
lower court's decision is plenary.  McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 
958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992).  But, to the extent that the 
district court's order was based on a factual conclusion, we 
review under a "clearly erroneous" standard.  Ram Constr., 749 
F.2d at 1053.  Accordingly, we apply a "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review to the court's finding that CIGNA Re failed to 
raise the limits defense before the summary judgment order was 
filed.  But our review of the court's finding that Unigard III is 
not an intervening change in controlling law is plenary because 
that denial was based upon the interpretation and application of 
a legal precept.  
 III. 
 In its appeal, North River contends the district court 
misinterpreted the reinsurance certificates.  Specifically, it 
claims the court misapplied the "follow the fortunes" clause, 
improperly conducted de novo review of the arbitrator's 
resolution of its coverage dispute with Owens-Corning, and 
wrongly concluded that defense costs were not covered under the 
  
original policy as reinsured.12  CIGNA Re argues that defense 
costs were not covered under the North River-Owens-Corning policy 
and that the district court properly relieved CIGNA Re of its 
obligation to "follow the fortunes" because North River's 
liability for costs stemmed from its decision to enter the 
Wellington Agreement and its failure to abide by Wellington 
procedures.  Under New York law,13 proper application of "follow 
the fortunes" requires us to analyze North River's coverage under 
the original policy to determine whether defense costs were 
outside the scope of the policy's coverage as reinsured.  We also 
must determine whether the Wellington Agreement provided coverage 
where there had been none. 
 North River contends such analysis is an impermissible 
de novo review of the arbitration.  We disagree.  "Follow the 
fortunes" forecloses relitigation of coverage disputes because 
when an insurer disclaims coverage its interests are generally 
aligned with those of its reinsurer.  Permitting reinsurers to 
revisit coverage issues would place insurers in an untenable 
position.  Inevitably, defenses insurers advanced in coverage 
contests would be used against them by reinsurers seeking to deny 
coverage.  Accordingly, a reinsurer challenging coverage may 
                     
12
.  North River also maintains the district court erred in its 
conclusions about the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith.  
We discuss the good faith issues infra at part IV.  
13
.  In accordance with the parties' stipulation, we will apply 
New York law to interpret the reinsurance contract and Ohio law 
to interpret the underlying insurance contract.  
  
obtain only deferential review of a determination of the 
insurer's liability to the insured: 
 [W]hat follow the fortunes does is to 
eliminate the possibility of the reinsurer's 
asking a court or an arbitration panel for a 
de novo determination of whether the settled 
claim was or was not within the scope of the 
cedent's policy. . . .  
  Follow the fortunes imposes a very 
different standard of review.  A reinsurer is 
bound to follow its cedent's fortunes in 
settling claims unless the reinsurer can show 
that the cedent did not act in good faith or 
after conducting a reasonable investigation.  
Thus, a court or panel, faced with a 
reinsurer's denial of liability, would ask 
not whether the underlying claim was covered 
by the cedent's policy, but whether there is 
any reasonable basis to conclude there was 
such coverage.  Only if the ceding company 
pays a claim that is clearly outside the 
scope of its policy, would the reinsurer's 
challenge be sustained.  
 
Clifford H. Schoenberg, L'Histoire Ancienne De "Follow the 
Fortunes", Mealey's Litigation Reports (Reinsurance), May 28, 
1992, at 17, 20. 
 We do not believe that asking whether the risk was 
unreinsured is tantamount to de novo review.  Although the 
arbitrator found that the original policy did not exclude 
coverage for defense costs, he acknowledged that the arbitration 
proceeding was "unique in that both the language of the policy 
and the language of the Wellington Agreement [were] material to 
the interpretation to be made."  Arb. Op. at 17.  Accordingly, we 
will consider whether the arbitrator could have reached the same 
result without the intervening Wellington Agreement.  Because 
"follow the fortunes" doctrine does not require the reinsurer to 
  
cover risks undertaken after the certificate of reinsurance is 
issued, CIGNA Re is not liable for coverage occasioned only 
because of the Wellington Agreement.  
 A. 
 The reinsurance certificates employed 
standard language, providing, "[T]he 
liability of [CIGNA Re] . . . shall follow 
that of [North River] and except as otherwise 
specifically provided herein, shall be 
subject in all respects to all the terms and 
conditions of [North River's] policy except 
such as may purport to create a direct 
obligation of [CIGNA Re] to [Owens-Corning]."  
Reinsuring Agreement ¶ A.  The certificate 
continued:  All claims involving this 
reinsurance, when settled by [North River], 
shall be binding on [CIGNA Re], which, shall 
be bound to pay its proportion of such 
settlements, and in addition thereto, . . . 
its proportion of expenses . . . incurred by 
[North River] in the investigation and 
settlement of claims or suits and, with the 
prior consent of the Reinsurer to trial court 
proceedings, its proportion of court costs 
and interest on any judgment or award.   
  
Id. ¶ C.  North River maintains the district court's failure to 
credit this language constituted a basic flaw in its analysis 
denying indemnification.    
 The district court characterized the first part of the 
quoted provisions as a "following forms" clause, suggesting that 
a "following forms" clause provides somewhat narrower coverage 
than a "follow the fortunes" clause, only obligating the 
reinsurer to cover risks insured under the original policy.  
North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1143.  The district court recognized 
that "follow the fortunes" doctrine goes further and requires 
indemnification for all payments made in good faith that are 
reasonably within the scope of the policy's coverage.  Id.  The 
CIGNA Re reinsurance certificate contained both "following forms" 
and "follow the fortunes" clauses.  But the district court 
discounted the import of the "follow the fortunes" language, 
erroneously limiting that doctrine to settlements.  
 The district court called the phrase "follow the 
fortunes" a misnomer, believing "[t]he British term, `follow the 
settlements,' more accurately characterize[d] the effect of such 
a clause."  Id.  The court went on to note, "The clause itself 
states that `all claims involving this reinsurance, when settled 
by [North River], shall be binding on [CIGNA Re] . . . .' 
(emphasis added.)  It does not state that CIGNA Re shall follow 
in the fortune, good or bad, of any litigation involving the 
underlying policy."  Id.  We believe the district court erred 
  
when it limited "follow the fortunes" doctrine to settlements.14  
Despite the explicit reference to "settlements" in the typical 
"follow the fortunes" clause, it is well settled that the 
principle applies generally to all outcomes of coverage disputes, 
whether in the form of settlements or judgments.15  See 13A John 
A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 7698 
(1976) (and cases cited therein) (reinsurer is generally bound by 
the judgment against the reinsured).16  Thus, we find the clause 
applies both to settlements and to judgments.17   
                     
14
.  We note, however, that despite stating that "follow the 
fortunes" clauses should be limited to settlements, the district 
court nevertheless went on to analyze this case under "follow the 
fortunes" doctrine. 
15
.  We see no difference between the effects of court judgments 
and arbitration decisions for "follow the fortunes" purposes.  To 
find otherwise would thwart "the announced policy of [the State 
of New York which] favors and encourages arbitration as a means 
of conserving the time and resources of the courts and the 
contracting parties."  Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. 
Co. of America, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. 1975).   
16
.  This principle is so well settled that there is a virtual 
absence of contemporary case law on the issue.  See Charles W. 
Havens, III, Recent Developments on the "Follow the Fortunes" 
Clause, in Reinsurance Litigation 1994:  Current Issues and 
Strategies at 27, 35-36 (PLI Com. Law and Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 695, 1994) ("Where a judgment has been 
entered against the reinsured, and the judgment is for risks 
covered under the reinsurance agreement, there is little room for 
the reinsurer to deny indemnification of the reinsured up to the 
stated policy limits, absent a lack of good faith in defending 
the action.  As such, most litigation involves the reinsured's 
settlement of a claim for which it then seeks indemnification 
from the reinsurer.")   
 Older cases involving reinsurance applied to judgments 
the doctrine described by an early treatise writer, Franciscus 
Roccus (d. 1676): iste secundus assecurator tenetur ad solvendum 
omne totum quod primus assecurator solverit.  We translate 
Roccus's doctrine as, "the reinsurer is held in full to the 
result that the primary insurer obtained," and equate it with 
  
 1. 
 "Follow the fortunes" doctrine protects the risk 
transfer mechanism by providing that covered losses pass 
uninterrupted along the risk transfer chain.  The same legal 
determinations that define the insurers' obligations must apply 
to reinsurers as well.  See 13A Appleman & Appleman, supra, § 
7698 (and cases cited therein) ("The reinsurer is generally bound 
by the judgment against the reinsured . . . .").  Generally, when 
an insurer loses -- or settles -- an underlying coverage dispute, 
"follow the fortunes" makes the payment to the insured binding on 
the reinsurer.  See Mentor Ins. Co. (U.K.) v. Brannkasse, 996 
F.2d 506, 517 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The follow-the-fortunes principle 
. . . simply requires payment where the [insurer's] good-faith 
payment is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance 
(..continued) 
"follow the fortunes."  See Hastie v. De Peyster, 3 Cai. R. 190, 
194-95 (N.Y. 1805) (insurer litigated and lost a coverage dispute 
with insured;  reinsurer liable for judgment and for costs 
charged to the insurer); c.f. New York State Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Protection Ins. Co., 18 F. Cas. 160, 160-161 (C.C. Mass. 1841) 
(applying New York law, found reinsurer bound to pay judgment and 
costs awarded against insurer in coverage suit with insured so 
long as suit conducted in good faith). 
17
.  We observe that the arbitration outcome between Owens-
Corning and North River may be a hybrid, possessing qualities of  
both a decision and a settlement.  The Wellington Agreement has 
been accurately described as "a global settlement."  See, e.g., 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning Up The Environmental Liability 
Insurance Mess, 27 Val. U. L. Rev. 601, 607 (1993).  Accordingly, 
resolutions of coverage disputes under the terms of Wellington 
arguably may be settlements, rather than judgments.  The parties 
to this dispute, however, have characterized the arbitrator's 
decision as a judgment.  Because we find that "follow the 
fortunes" doctrine applies to judgments as well as to 
settlements, we need not refine the distinction here. 
  
coverage that was reinsured."); Christiania Gen. Ins. Corp. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 280 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A 
reinsurer cannot second guess the good faith liability 
determinations made by its reinsured . . . .");  Insurance Co. of 
New York v. Associated Mfrs.' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.S. 1038, 
1039 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902), aff'd, 66 N.E. 1110 (N.Y. 1903) ("In 
the absence, therefore, of fraud or bad faith on the part of the 
[insurer], the [reinsurer], by the terms of its policy . . . is 
in no position to object to the mode of adjustment as made by the 
[insurer].").  Thus, "follow the fortunes" doctrine creates an 
exception to the general rule that contract interpretation is 
subject to de novo review.  See, e.g., Schoenberg, supra, at 20 
("Follow the fortunes imposes a very different standard of 
review. . . . [A] court or panel, faced with a reinsurer's denial 
of liability, would ask not whether the underlying claim was 
covered by the cedent's policy, but whether there is any 
reasonable basis to conclude there was such coverage.")   
 2. 
 There are compelling policy reasons that counsel 
against de novo review under "follow the fortunes" doctrine.  
Although the interests of a primary insurer and its insured may 
often be adverse, "the interests of a reinsurer and the ceding 
primary insurer with respect to a pending claim are generally 
identical. . . . [T]he interests of both parties are furthered 
through the primary insurer's efficient investigation and defense 
of the claim and through the resolution of the claim on the best 
terms possible."  Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 
  
594 N.E.2d 571, 574 (N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted) ("Unigard 
II").  To permit the reinsurer to revisit coverage issues 
resolved between the insurer and its insured would place insurers 
in the untenable position of advancing defenses in coverage 
contests that would be used against them by reinsurers seeking to 
deny coverage.  Accordingly, "follow the fortunes" doctrine 
generally forecloses relitigation of coverage disputes because:  
 Were the Court to conduct a de novo review of 
[the insurer's] decision-making process, the 
foundation of the cedent-reinsurer 
relationship would be forever damaged.  The 
goals of maximum coverage and settlement that 
have been long established would give way to 
a proliferation of litigation.  Cedents faced 
with de novo review of their claims 
determinations would ultimately litigate 
every coverage issue before making any 
attempt at settlement."   
 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters & 
Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London, 868 F. Supp. 917, 
921 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
 3. 
 But, "[w]hile the `follow the fortune' clause is 
certainly a broad one, it is clear that the reinsurer is liable 
only for `a loss of the kind reinsured.'"  Insurance Co. of N. 
Am. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1971) (quoting Western Assurance Co. v. Poole,  1 K.B. 
376) (1903)), aff'd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).  "It 
would be an unwarranted and indeed tortured construction of that 
clause to hold a reinsurer bound, for example, to pay if the 
prime insurer paid monies to its insured on a claim completely 
  
without the scope of the policy and not in good faith."  Id.; see 
also Gregory & Christakos, supra, at 544 & n.40 (and cases cited 
therein) (reinsurer is only responsible for covered claims).  
Where the reinsured's liability attaches from a settlement or 
binding judgment, the reinsurer is not accountable if the 
liability arises from uninsured activity.  See 2 Klaus 
Gerathewohl et al., Reinsurance Principles and Practice ch. 14, 
at 51 (John C. La Bonte trans., 1980) ("Since the freedom of the 
reinsurer to assume or refuse a risk is a typical element of 
facultative reinsurance, it would be contrary to this type of 
reinsurance if the reinsurer were obliged to follow subsequent -- 
factual or contractual -- changes in the underlying direct 
insurance.").   
 This protection for the reinsurer is based on 
principles of contractual intent: a reinsurer cannot be held 
liable for a kind of loss that it did not agree to cover.  This 
distinction between reinsured and unreinsured risk is 
particularly important in facultative reinsurance where the 
reinsurer accepts only specific risks.  Thus, for example, in 
Insurance Co. of North America, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 524, the court 
found a reinsurer was not liable to cover a payment for lost 
cargo under a facultative certificate where the loss was due to a 
"shore risk" that was not insured under the original policy 
because "[t]he defendant never consented to reinsure this loss 
not covered in the original insurance policy."  In Bellefonte 
Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d 
Cir. 1990), Aetna had settled a coverage dispute with A.H. 
  
Robins, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, agreeing to pay an 
amount substantially in excess of the cap stated in the 
reinsurance certificates.  The court rejected the insurer's claim 
that its reinsurer should cover these payments because "[s]uch a 
reading would be contrary to the parties' express agreement and 
to the settled law of contract interpretation."  Id. at 913.  And 
in American Insurance Co. v. North American Co. for Property & 
Casualty Insurance, 697 F.2d 79, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1982) ("NACPAC"), 
the court held the reinsurer was not obligated to "follow the 
fortunes" of the insurer in making a settlement that covered 
punitive damages resulting from corporate misconduct because the 
underlying policy and the reinsurance certificate did not cover 
such misconduct. 
 4.   
 The arbitrator held North River liable to pay Owens-
Corning's defense costs.  Both parties contend the basis of that 
holding forms the heart of this dispute and their arguments raise 
competing principles.  On the one hand, in order to preserve 
"follow the fortunes" doctrine, courts may not conduct de novo 
review of a judgment imposing liability on the insurer.  On the 
other, to protect the contractual intent of the parties, courts 
must reexamine the judgment to determine whether the liability 
represents a risk not contemplated by the terms of the underlying 
policy as reinsured.  But "follow the fortunes" doctrine requires 
a court to find reinsurance coverage unless the reinsurer 
demonstrates the liability to the insured was the result of fraud 
and collusion or not reasonably within the scope of the original 
  
policy.18  We conduct plenary review of the district court's 
interpretation of the reinsurance certificates and its 
application of controlling legal principles.  See New Castle 
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1183 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (standard of review of district court's interpretation 
of insurance polices and its application of controlling legal 
principles is plenary).  In applying the doctrine of "follow the 
fortunes," the district court properly required CIGNA Re to show 
that the underlying policy language "as a matter of Ohio law, 
unambiguously provides that the policies do not pay defense 
costs."  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1144 (citing NACPAC, 697 
F.2d at 80-81).  But we believe the district court misapplied 
this standard and came to the wrong conclusion.  CIGNA Re has not 
made the required showing.   
 B.  
 CIGNA Re claims defense costs were not reinsured 
because they were not covered under the original insurance 
policy.  Accordingly, "[t]o determine what type of loss was 
reinsured, we must turn to the original insurance contract."  
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 523.  North River 
insured Owens-Corning against "ultimate net loss," North River-
Owens-Corning Insuring Agreement ("Insuring Agreement") ¶ 1, 
which was defined as "the sums paid in settlement of losses for 
                     
18
.  We will address the reinsurer's allegations of bad faith 
later in the opinion.  Here we will limit our discussion to CIGNA 
Re's contention that the payments made were outside the scope of 
the policy as reinsured. 
  
which the Insured is liable . . . and shall exclude all `Costs.'"  
Id. ¶ 13.  The policy defined "costs" as "interest on judgments, 
investigation, adjustment and legal expenses."  Id. ¶ 14.19  The 
policy, however, also provided that costs incurred by Owens-
Corning "with the written consent of [North River]" would be 
apportioned.  Id. ¶ 15.  Elsewhere the policy referred to North 
River's "obligation to pay any ultimate net loss and costs" when 
underlying limits have been paid.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 The policy did not include a duty to defend clause.  
Instead, the policy included a provision holding Owens-Corning 
"solely responsible for the investigation, settlement, defense 
and final disposition of any claim made or suit brought or 
proceeding instituted against the Insured . . . ."  Id. ¶ 9.  
Another provision stated: 
 At no time shall [North River] be called upon 
to assume charge of the settlement or defense 
of any claims made or suits brought or 
proceedings instituted against [Owens-
Corning], but [North River] shall have the 
right and shall be given the opportunity to 
associate  with [Owens-Corning] or its 
underlying insurer or insurers, or both, in 
the control, defense and/or trial of any 
claims, suits or proceedings which, in the 
opinion of [North River], involves or appears 
reasonably likely to involve [North River]. 
 
Id. ¶ 8.   
                     
19
.  The policy excluded from "costs" expenses and regular fees 
for "counsel on general retainer" and "office expenses of the 
Insured."  Neither of the parties to this dispute has addressed 
the significance of this "exclusion within an exclusion."  See 
infra note 20 for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's treatment 
of an identical provision. 
  
 The parties have stipulated that Ohio law governs the 
interpretation of the underlying insurance policy.  Accordingly, 
we must turn to Ohio case law to interpret the provisions 
relating to the exclusion for costs. 
 1. 
 Ohio law places the burden of proving an exclusion from 
coverage on the insurer.  "An exclusion must be stated clearly in 
explicit wording setting forth with specificity exactly what is 
to be excluded."  River Servs. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., 449 F. Supp. 622, 626 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (citing numerous 
cases);  see also Moorman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 445 N.E.2d 
1122, 1124-25 (Ohio 1983) (citation omitted) ("[T]hat which is 
not clearly excluded from the operation of such contract is 
included in the operation thereof. . . .  If it were intended 
that the exclusion should apply in this circumstance, then 
language so extending application of the exclusion could have 
been incorporated into the policy.").   
 The arbitrator, too, placed the burden of proving an 
exclusion from coverage on the insurer, believing North River 
needed to prove that the policy language relieved it of the duty 
to pay defense costs.  Under the terms of the original policy, 
the arbitrator found the exclusion for costs was qualified by the 
consent provision.  The arbitrator stated, "The condition of 
consent does not constitute an exclusion of the obligation of the 
insurer to pay costs," and concluded that North River had not 
carried its burden of proving the exclusion for costs applied.  
Arb. Op. at 20, 22-23.   
  
 It is well established under Ohio law that: 
  The meaning of a contract is to be 
gathered from a consideration of all its 
parts, and no provision is to be wholly 
disregarded as inconsistent with other 
provisions unless no other reasonable 
construction is possible. 
  A special provision will be held to 
override a general provision only where the 
two cannot stand together.  If reasonable 
effect can be given to both, each is to be 
retained. 
Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d 403, 406-07 
(Ohio 1984) (quoting German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost, 45 N.E. 1097, 
1097-98 (Ohio 1897) (paragraphs 1 and 2 of syllabus).  Although 
the treatment of defense costs under the Owens-Corning-North 
River policy is inconsistent, the arbitrator's interpretation 
gives reasonable effect to the various parts.  For example, 
although at paragraph one of the policy North River agreed to 
indemnify Owens-Corning against "ultimate net loss," which was 
defined to exclude "costs," paragraph eleven referred to North 
River's obligation to pay both ultimate net loss and costs.  The 
arbitrator reasonably interpreted these apparent inconsistencies 
as providing a limited exclusion for costs. 
 The district court focused on paragraph fifteen of the 
policy, which refers to the apportionment of costs incurred "with 
the written consent of the Company," and found that North River 
could only be liable for defense costs associated with litigation 
or settlement to which it had given its formal consent.  But such 
a literal reading of paragraph fifteen would be inconsistent with 
paragraph eleven of the policy, which provides that North River's 
  
obligation to pay costs shall not attach until the underlying 
limits have been paid.  Compliance with both paragraphs is 
practically infeasible.  Read literally, these paragraphs would 
require an insured to obtain written consent from its excess 
insurer before it could permit its primary insurer to engage in 
litigation or settlement in its behalf -- even though the excess 
insurer would not be responsible for the resulting liability 
unless the primary insurer's limits were exhausted.  Strict 
construction of both provisions would yield an unreasonable 
effect.   
 After examining the policy language, the arbitrator 
determined, "The word `consent' and associated words employed in 
[the insurance policy] are not to be given their plain or literal 
meanings . . . ."  Arb. Op. at 23.  Having implicitly found an 
ambiguity, he looked to extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning 
of consented-to costs.  He noted that credible evidence 
established that these words have particular meaning within the 
insurance industry and relied on testimony that the condition of 
consent is a term of art within the insurance industry.  Id.  For 
example, Graves Hewitt, an insurance consultant and former Chief 
Executive Officer of First State Insurance Company, stated that 
it would be "very rare" for an insured to make a formal request 
of an insurer for consent.  Id. at 20.  C. James Ayliffe, a 
retired British insurance executive "whose substantial career was 
involved within the American insurance market," testified that he 
had never experienced a case where the insured would go to the 
excess carrier for consent to costs being incurred.  Id.  And 
  
William G. Carson, Director of Home Office Underwriting for Crum 
& Forster, explained that a policy requirement that written 
consent be obtained before costs are incurred does not 
necessarily constitute a condition to the payment of costs.  Id.  
Therefore, on the basis of the language of the policy and 
industry practice, the arbitrator concluded that the inconsistent 
provisions could not establish an express exclusion of 
coverage.20  Id. at 23.  We believe the arbitrator's 
interpretation is not unreasonable under Ohio law and gives 
                     
20
.  Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
addressed this question in a similar context and, finding an 
ambiguity in an insurance policy, ordered a remand for 
consideration of extrinsic evidence of intent to cover defense 
costs.  In Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 16 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 1994), the court considered an 
identical definitional provision, but focused on different 
language:  Within the paragraph excluding costs from the 
definition of loss, a parenthetical excluded from the exclusion 
in-house defense costs.  The court noted that neither the 
district court nor the parties was "able to explain, without 
looking outside of the policy, why the definition of loss would 
carve out" this exception within an exception.  Id. at 687.  The 
court then found the policy ambiguous because, under Ohio law, 
"contracts are not to be interpreted in a manner that renders any 
phrase surplusage."  Id.   
 Neither North River, Owens-Corning, nor the arbitrator 
addressed whether the same parenthetical exclusion within the 
exclusion rendered the definition of costs ambiguous in this 
case.  Without adopting the Sixth Circuit's conclusion, we 
nevertheless note that the presence of such an ambiguity might 
have defeated North River's efforts to establish an express 
exclusion for costs.  It is well settled under Ohio law that 
provisions in an insurance contract that are "reasonably 
susceptible of more than one meaning will be construed liberally 
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer."  
Faruque v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 508 N.E.2d 949, 
952 (Ohio 1987) (citing numerous cases).  Accordingly, we note 
that application of this rule to the provision could have yielded 
the conclusion that defense costs were covered. 
  
effect to the inconsistent requirements of prior consent and 
exhaustion of underlying limits in the policy.  
  2. 
 To deny reimbursement under "follow the fortunes" 
doctrine, the reinsurer must show that the arbitrator's decision 
allowed coverage of defense costs that were not reasonably within 
the scope of the policy.  See, e.g., North River, 831 F. Supp. at 
1144 (requiring demonstration that underlying policies 
"unambiguously" do not pay defense costs).  Accordingly, it is 
CIGNA Re's burden to prove that Ohio law would not support the 
arbitrator's construction of the policy.  CIGNA Re, however, has 
neither relied on nor cited to any Ohio case directly on point.  
Nor have we found any.  
 The arbitrator asserted, without citation to supporting 
cases, that his interpretation of the consent clause was 
"consistent with the overwhelming body of American case law which 
declares where the reservation to consent to a material contract 
matter is made, such consent cannot unreasonably be withheld."  
Arb. Op. at 22.  Consent clauses are drafted for the benefit of 
insurers -- they are intended to protect insurers against 
liability for mishandled suits and settlements.  See 7C Appleman 
& Appleman, supra, § 4681 (provision requiring insurer's prior 
consent gives insurer right to protect itself against unwarranted 
liability claims).  Ohio courts construing such language have 
required reimbursement despite the absence of formal consent, 
  
finding the condition applies only where consent has been 
reasonably withheld.21   
 The district court stated that "cases from numerous 
other jurisdictions support the conclusion that these policy 
terms unambiguously do not provide for the payment of defense 
costs."  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1145.  The cases cited by 
the district court linked liability for defense costs to an 
insurer's duty to defend, relieving insurers of liability for 
costs where there was no duty to defend.22  We note, however, 
that because these cases come from jurisdictions other than Ohio, 
they do not control our interpretation of the insurance contract. 
 Although the district court believed that the policies 
did not contemplate North River consenting to pay defense costs 
without first agreeing to associate in the defense, the 
arbitrator declined to link the consent clause to the exclusion 
                     
21
.  See, e.g., Bogan v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 521 
N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ohio 1988) ("[A]n insurer may not avoid coverage 
by unreasonably refusing to consent to a settlement . . . .");  
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Handlovic, 492 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ohio 
1986) ("An insurer may not avoid a valid judgment obtained by an 
insured . . . solely because the insurer did not provide written 
consent to the prosecution of the action resulting in the 
judgment."); c.f. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Metro Regional 
Transit Auth., 802 F. Supp. 169, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (insured 
had a right to be reimbursed for its expenditures where insurer 
wrongfully refused to defend), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 
591 (6th Cir. 1993).   
22
.  See Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 
233 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Cornhusker Agric. 
Ass'n v. Equitable Gen. Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Neb. 
1986); Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & 
Casualty Co., 716 S.W.2d 348, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Chicago & 
Illinois R.R. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 425 N.E.2d 429, 433-34 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981).  
  
of a duty to defend.  He found that the language in paragraphs 
eight and nine, making the insured "solely responsible" for the 
defense effort and acquitting North River of any responsibility 
to assume charge of the defense effort, was "not dispositive of 
any substantive economic matter" but controlled the assignment of 
procedural responsibilities.  Arb. Op. at 18.  We do not think it 
was unreasonable to interpret this policy without linking the 
obligation to pay defense costs to a duty to defend.  It would 
appear that an excess insurer and its insured would have good 
reason to omit a duty to defend clause from an excess policy:  in 
most instances the primary insurer already would have accepted 
the duty to defend the insured.  That reason, however, does not 
compel the conclusion that the insured also intended to relieve 
the excess insurer of all liability for defense costs accrued in 
excess of the primary insurer's limits -- especially when such 
costs would be incurred in an effort to avoid liability that the 
excess insurer would have to pay.  Accordingly, we cannot agree 
with the district court that under the facts of this case an 
agreement to pay costs must be linked to acceptance of a duty to 
defend.   
  C. 
 CIGNA Re relies on the district court's finding that 
the arbitrator's decision was based on the Wellington Agreement 
and was not supported by the language of the original policies as 
reinsured.  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1145.  But we believe 
the district court erred when it concluded that the arbitrator's 
decision was not supported by the underlying insurance policies.  
  
The arbitrator devoted several pages of his opinion to an 
analysis of the condition of consent to the payment of defense 
costs in the insurance policy.  He concluded North River was 
obligated to cover Owens-Corning's defense costs because the 
insurer had failed to meet its burden of establishing that the 
policy excluded coverage of defense costs.  Arb. Op. at 19-23.   
 The district court rejected the arbitrator's 
conclusion, adopting instead the reasoning of courts from 
jurisdictions other than Ohio to interpret the policy.  But this 
de novo review of the arbitrator's judgment was improper.  As we 
have noted, the purpose of "follow the fortunes" doctrine is to 
preserve the risk transfer mechanism.  Without "follow the 
fortunes" doctrine, reinsureds would be in the impossible 
position of advancing defenses in coverage contests that could be 
used against them by reinsurers seeking to deny liability.  This 
would frustrate the expectations of the reinsurance relationship.  
To that end, the doctrine forecloses courts from conducting de 
novo review of dispositions of coverage disputes between insurers 
and their insureds for the benefit of reinsurers.  Generally, 
reinsurers are limited to two inquiries:  first, they may ask 
whether an insurer engaged in fraud or collusion in the payment 
of a claim, and second, whether a claim arose from a risk clearly 
outside the policy as reinsured.  Once those questions are 
answered in the negative, the reinsurer may not second guess the 
resolution of a particular dispute over coverage.   
 Accordingly, absent fraud or collusion, to avoid 
liability CIGNA Re had to show that the arbitrator's decision 
  
ordered payments that were not reasonably within the scope of the 
policy as interpreted under Ohio law.  But the arbitrator's 
conclusion that defense costs are reasonably within the scope of 
coverage contemplated by the original policy is not inconsistent 
with Ohio law.  Because CIGNA Re has failed to establish that 
Ohio law would not support the arbitrator's construction of the 
insurance policy provision as requiring the insurer to pay 
defense costs, we hold CIGNA Re must follow North River's 
fortunes and reimburse for the defense costs paid.23 
 1. 
 CIGNA Re emphasizes that, under Wellington, there was a 
presumption of coverage for defense costs:  "[U]nless it 
expressly provides otherwise, each excess insurance policy . . . 
also shall pay allocated expenses . . . ."  Wellington Agreement 
§ XI, ¶ 1.  CIGNA Re contends this provision changed the 
insurance coverage, and the reinsurer need not follow the 
insurer's fortunes because, before the Agreement, North River was 
not liable for defense costs.24  We disagree.  Under Ohio law, 
                     
23
.  We also recognize that CIGNA Re could have avoided liability 
for defense costs if it had expressly excluded such coverage in 
the reinsurance certificates it issued to North River.  The 
reinsurance certificates, however, did not contain such an 
exclusion.  On the contrary, the "follow the fortunes" clauses in 
the CIGNA Re-North River reinsurance certificates expressly refer 
to the reinsurer's obligation to reimburse for "court costs and 
interest on any judgment or award" arising out of consented-to 
litigation.  Reinsuring Agreement ¶ C.  Because CIGNA Re has not 
contended that its certificates excluded costs, we will not 
explore the implications of this provision. 
24
.  CIGNA Re has noted that in another case involving North 
River excess insurance certificates, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit concluded that signing Wellington altered North 
  
the standard for establishing an exclusion from coverage is 
substantially the same as that provided by Wellington:  "An 
exclusion must be stated clearly in explicit wording setting 
forth with specificity exactly what is to be excluded."  River 
Servs., 449 F. Supp. at 626.  We have found that under this 
standard North River could have been liable for Owens-Corning's 
defense costs even before it signed onto Wellington.  See supra 
part III.B. 
 Furthermore, we believe CIGNA Re's argument that the 
arbitrator's decision is tainted by Wellington's presumption of 
coverage for costs is misleading.  It overlooks one purpose of 
"follow the fortunes" doctrine, which is to foreclose the 
relitigation of coverage disputes.  Our analysis is governed by 
the inquiry required by "follow the fortunes" doctrine:  Was the 
paid risk clearly outside the scope of the original policy's 
coverage?  Because a reasonable interpretation of the original 
policy under Ohio law would allow coverage for defense costs, the 
arbitrator's decision survives our limited review.  Therefore we 
(..continued) 
River's obligation to pay costs.  Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1068 
("[T]he Agreement altered North River's liabilities, including 
requiring it to pay some claims and administrative costs for 
which it was not liable under the original policies."); see also 
id. at 1066 ("[T]he signing of the Wellington Agreement 
substantially altered the terms of the reinsurance 
certificate.").  Unigard III is distinguishable from our case, 
however.  In Unigard III, the court found that the payments for 
which North River sought reinsurance coverage were made pursuant 
to an insurance-allocation formula that was purely a creature of 
the Wellington Agreement.  Here CIGNA Re has not challenged the 
allocation formula.  Thus, the Second Circuit's holding that the 
Wellington Agreement materially altered North River's coverage is 
not applicable to the dispute in this case. 
  
hold that absent bad faith "follow the fortunes" compels coverage 
by the reinsurer.   
  IV. 
 We turn next to the question whether North River 
violated the duty of good faith implied in every reinsurance 
contract.  To establish a breach of the duty, the district court 
required the reinsurer, CIGNA Re, to prove "(1) that the 
reinsured acted with gross negligence or recklessness, and (2) 
that the reinsurer as a result has suffered `prejudice,' defined 
as `economic injury.'"   North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1146 
(citing Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1068-69).  Holding that the 
failure to take all businesslike steps could constitute gross 
negligence, the court concluded that North River violated its 
duty to CIGNA Re through "gross negligence in: (1) failing to 
recognize how signing the Wellington Agreement materially 
expanded the defense obligation under the Owens-Corning policies, 
and (2) triggering the strict penalty in Appendix D of the 
agreement by failing to schedule the policies within the 20-day 
period."  Id.  North River contends the district court erred 
because bad faith requires a willful disregard of the reinsurer's 
interest.  Although North River incorrectly states the applicable 
standard of care,25 we hold that CIGNA Re has not established, as 
                     
25
.  Under New York law, which the parties agree governs the 
reinsurance relationship, an insurer violates the duty of good 
faith where its conduct rises to the level of gross negligence or 
recklessness.  See Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1069.  It is, 
therefore, not necessary to find willful disregard of the 
reinsurer's interests. 
  
a matter of law, that North River breached its duty of good 
faith.  On the contrary, we find only two instances of North 
River's conduct that raise questions of bad faith.   
 A. 
 When analyzing the duty of notice owed by a reinsured 
to its reinsurer, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
described the duty as one of "utmost good faith, requiring the 
reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all facts that materially 
affect the risk of which it is aware and of which the reinsurer 
itself has no reason to be aware."  Christiania Gen. Ins. v. 
Great Am. Ins., 979 F.2d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Sun Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485, 510 (1883)).  
Nevertheless, "because these contracts are usually negotiated at 
arms length by experienced insurance companies," the court went 
on to reject Christiania's characterization of the relationship 
between a reinsured and reinsurer as being inevitably fiduciary 
in nature.  Id. at 280-81.  In the same vein, in Unigard III, the 
Second Circuit conceded that utmost good faith may not accurately 
describe the modern relationship of sophisticated insurers 
bargaining at "arms length."  Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1066.  
"Nevertheless," the court concluded, "because information 
regarding risks lies with the ceding insurer, the reinsurance 
market depends upon a high level of good faith to ensure prompt 
and full disclosure."  Id. at 1066.   
 But in applying this standard, the Unigard III court 
required the reinsurer to show bad faith, not mere negligence.  
In Unigard III, the court held that North River's negligent 
  
failure to give Unigard, its reinsurer, adequate notice of its 
signature to the Wellington Agreement did not breach its duty of 
good faith.26  The court emphasized that "the proper minimum 
standard for bad faith should be gross negligence or 
recklessness."  Id. at 1069.   
 The origin of the standard of utmost good faith lies in 
the insurer-insured relationship.  But, as a recent commentator 
has noted, "[r]einsurance involves two sophisticated business 
entities familiar with the business of insurance who bargain at 
arm's length for the terms in their contract."  Steven W. Thomas, 
Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance:  A Tradition in Need of 
Adjustment,  41 Duke L.J. 1548, 1554 (1992).   Thomas notes, "The 
phrase `good faith' is used in a variety of contexts, and its 
meaning varies somewhat with the context."  Id. (citing the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981)).  He reasons, 
"[T]he differences between original insurance and reinsurance 
argue for a more fact-specific application of the good faith 
standard."  Id. at 1553.  In our view, the approach taken by the 
                     
26
.  Unigard III addressed two issues that have not been raised 
in this dispute.  First, Unigard had objected to the effects of 
Wellington because, under the Agreement, North River and Unigard 
became liable for a greater proportion of claims due to an 
insurance-allocation formula peculiar to the Agreement.  Unigard 
III, 4 F.3d at 1066.  That provision of Wellington is not raised 
in this dispute.  See supra note 24.  Second, in Unigard III, the 
reinsurance certificates gave the reinsurer the right to 
associate in the defense and settlement of claims, but under 
Wellington the Facility became the "sole agent" and had 
"exclusive authority and discretion to administer, evaluate, 
settle, pay or defend all asbestos-related claims."  Id.  This 
issue has not been raised in the present dispute, either.   
  
Second Circuit in Unigard III applies an appropriate standard of 
good faith.  We adopt that standard in the reinsurance context.   
 The district court granted summary judgment to CIGNA 
Re, finding North River had violated its duty of good faith by 
gross negligence in (1) failing to recognize how signing the 
Wellington Agreement materially expanded the defense obligation 
under the original policies, and (2) triggering the strict 
penalty in Appendix D of the Agreement by failing to schedule.  
North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1146.  The district court found 
other evidence of bad faith that it did not rely on in granting 
summary judgment to CIGNA Re because the evidence presented 
disputed questions of fact:  specifically, North River's 
rejection of the compromise settlement, its failure to inform 
CIGNA Re of the nature of the settlement, and its failure to keep 
CIGNA Re apprised of the progress of the arbitration proceeding. 
Id. at 1147-48.  The district court also noted that North River's 
decision to drop the appeal could have raised a question of bad 
faith, but found the unlikelihood of success meant that no 
economic prejudice resulted to CIGNA Re.  Id. at 1148. 
 1. 
 The district court noted that before signing onto 
Wellington, Crum & Forster did not perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of the Agreement's impact on various types of policies 
and, particularly, did not analyze the effect on the Owens-
Corning policies.  Id. at 1146-47.  But Crum & Forster made a 
general assessment of the benefits Wellington offered to its 
policyholders, to itself as an insurer, and to its reinsurers.  
  
The company decided to join Wellington "because it was 
unconscionable that public money was being wasted the way it 
was."  See Heap Dep. at 119, reprinted in app. at 1816.  Before 
signing Wellington, senior executive officers at North River's 
corporate parent, Crum & Forster, evaluated the proposal and 
considered the overall benefits of entering into the Agreement.  
Ian Heap, a Senior Vice President who was the senior executive 
officer responsible for Crum & Forster's participation in the 
Wellington negotiations, attended informational meetings and 
provided status reports to senior management.  And before 
entering into the final Agreement, Crum & Forster signed a 
"Conditional Subscription" to Wellington.  One of the conditions 
to proceeding with the final Agreement was the receipt of 
sufficient support from reinsurers.  To that end, the company 
alerted all its reinsurers that it was considering signing 
Wellington and asked for their opinions.  None of them questioned 
the decision.  Crum & Forster held meetings with reinsurers in 
May and June, 1985, and received reinsurer support for the idea 
of signing the Agreement.  A memorandum from Ian Heap reporting 
on these meetings concludes, "The commitment by major reinsurers 
in both the international and domestic markets to support the 
Facility was sufficient comfort to the majority of conditional 
insurer subscribers that most of them signed the final Agreement 
on June 19th."27   App. at 1831.  Thus, the record indicates 
                     
27
.  Among the reinsurers North River believed had "accepted the 
basic principles and agreed the payments made by the Facility on 
these principles would be seen to be good payments" was INA 
Reinsurance Company.  App. at 1830.  CIGNA Re is the successor to 
  
North River broadly considered the effect that signing the 
Agreement would have on its reinsurance coverage and made a 
deliberate judgment that it would be beneficial to participate.28  
Nevertheless, it appears that Crum & Forster failed to make a 
narrow analysis of the effect of Wellington on individual 
policies or policyholders and consequently on its reinsurance 
agreements.   
 We need not decide whether this failure raises a 
question of Crum & Forster's gross negligence or recklessness 
toward its reinsurers because to establish a breach of the duty 
of good faith, CIGNA Re also must show that it suffered prejudice 
due to North River's conduct.  We have found, however, that the 
standard for establishing an exclusion from coverage was 
substantially the same under Wellington as under Ohio law, and 
the terms of the Agreement did not expand the coverage of the 
underlying policies.  See supra parts III.B. and C.  Accordingly, 
(..continued) 
INA Re.  See North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1132 (caption), 1135 
(text).  
28
.  The district court referred to testimony by Ian Heap, 
relying on his statement that "if in their judgment reinsurers 
failed [to go along with Wellington], then we had the business 
risk of being without reinsurance, and it was one that I felt 
Crum and Forster was prepared to take."  North River, 831 F. 
Supp. at 1137 (emphasis omitted).  But Heap came to this 
conclusion because he was, "extremely concerned about the 
inability of the reinsurance community to articulate its position 
clearly of whether or not it was to give full support to the 
Wellington Agreement."  He testified, "It seemed to me that the 
industry had to move along the path of this alternative dispute 
resolution, and in the public interest we as insurers had to go 
along with it."  Id.  We do not believe this testimony 
establishes bad faith.  
  
we find, as a matter of law, that CIGNA Re cannot show economic 
prejudice due to North River's entry into Wellington.   
 2. 
 The district court found that North River's failure to 
abide by the scheduling procedures amounted to gross negligence 
and resulted in economic prejudice to CIGNA Re.  North River, 831 
F. Supp. at 1147.  We believe, however, that these are disputed 
questions of material fact.  North River did not execute the 
scheduling certificate for the Owens-Corning policies, and under 
the Wellington Agreement an insurer who did not execute the 
scheduling certificate within twenty days of signing was deemed 
to have assented to the schedules as submitted by the insured.  
But we cannot say, as a matter of law, whether under these 
circumstances noncompliance with the scheduling procedure amounts 
to gross negligence or recklessness and whether, as a result, 
CIGNA Re suffered economic injury.  These are questions for the 
trier of fact. 
 The record indicates that before signing the Agreement, 
representatives from Crum & Forster and Owens-Corning, along with 
other manufacturers and insurers, met in Pittsburgh to discuss 
outstanding issues pertaining to the Wellington Agreement.  The 
policy schedules were discussed, and North River's 
representatives took the position that defense costs were not 
covered by its excess policies.  Owens-Corning maintained they 
were covered.  The meeting ended with the parties agreeing to 
disagree.  Following the final execution of the Wellington 
Agreement, Owens-Corning submitted schedules of expected coverage 
  
and certificates indicating its policy form designation 
concerning defense costs.29  Robert Clare, a representative from 
Crum & Forster who was actively involved in evaluating the 
Wellington Agreement and who had attended the Pittsburgh 
meetings, drafted a letter response with eight paragraphs of 
coverage reservations.  This letter also noted that Crum & 
Forster "understood a final determination re any Policy Form has 
not been made" with respect to defense costs.  See McMahon Dep. 
at 124, reprinted in app. at 1171 (deposition transcript quoting 
letter). 
 At arbitration, North River argued Owens-Corning's 
defense costs were not covered and claimed it had expressed its 
continuing disagreement with a "G" designation to Owens-Corning 
at the Pittsburgh meeting and in the Clare letter.  The 
arbitrator found, however, that the right to challenge a policy's 
designation could be exercised only by employing Wellington's 
scheduling procedures, and that even if the Agreement did permit 
alternative methods of noting disagreement, North River's letter 
did not sufficiently communicate a rejection of the "G" 
designation.  Arb. Op. at 12-15. 
 The district court found that North River's conduct 
violated the duty of good faith.  In light of the Agreement's 
sanction for failing to execute the scheduling form, North 
                     
29
.  As we have noted, those certificates designated the policies 
as form "G," which provided, "[t]he insurance policy pays 
allocated expenses and such expenses do not apply against 
aggregate limits."  See supra part II.A. 
  
River's attempt to preserve its defense certainly was inadequate.  
Nevertheless, the detail of North River's letter response 
reflects its clear intent to preserve coverage defenses.  
Furthermore, we note that North River and Owens-Corning shared a 
history of dealing.  At this stage, the Wellington Agreement was 
terra incognita to both companies and the parties who formed 
Wellington did so with the aim of encouraging discussion and non-
litigious resolution of disagreements.  We do not believe, on 
these facts, that the failure to execute the scheduling 
certificate establishes as a matter of law either gross 
negligence or recklessness.  Instead, whether North River's 
conduct manifested gross negligence or recklessness is a disputed 
question of material fact.     
 Furthermore, to establish a breach of the duty of good 
faith, CIGNA Re must prove that it suffered economic injury 
because of North River's allegedly grossly negligent or reckless 
conduct.  But even had North River complied with the scheduling 
requirements the outcome for CIGNA Re may not have been 
different.30  Thus, this, too, is a question that must be 
resolved by the trier of fact. 
 3. 
 CIGNA Re contends that North River's behavior in 
connection with the initial arbitrator's settlement 
                     
30
.  Because Owens-Corning had scheduled the policies as "G," 
paying defense costs beyond policy limits, even if North River 
had scheduled properly, the arbitrator could have found that the 
policy language contemplated coverage of defense costs.   
  
recommendation manifested bad faith.31  The district court found 
that CIGNA Re had presented evidence raising factual disputes on 
this point.  The district court discussed two events relating to 
the settlement recommendation.  First, the district court found 
evidence that North River failed accurately to inform its 
reinsurers of the nature of the settlement offered.  Second, the 
court considered whether North River's rejection of the 
settlement recommendation reflected a failure to act in a proper 
and businesslike manner toward its reinsurers.   
 In September, 1988, Crum & Forster wrote to its 
reinsurers that the mediator had recommended a settlement that 
would require payment of defense expenses in addition to policy 
limits.  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1147-48.  In fact, however, 
the mediator had recommended that the parties settle on an "H" 
form designation, allowing payment of defense costs, but within 
policy limits.  Id. at 1148.  We do not believe the inaccuracy in 
the letter standing alone could establish gross negligence of the 
insurer's duty to its reinsurers. 
 But in further support of its contention that Crum & 
Forster's rejection of the settlement recommendation manifested 
bad faith, CIGNA Re proffered a January 29, 1988 memorandum from 
George B. Luteran describing a meeting where Crum & Forster 
officials discussed the possibility of compromising on the 
allocated costs issue.  The memorandum notes, "[I]f we were to 
                     
31
.  The arbitrator had advised Crum & Forster to settle with 
Owens-Corning by designating the policies as "H," paying defense 
costs within indemnity limits.   
  
compromise on the allocated costs issue we would have an 
extremely difficult time in recovering any money spent for such 
costs from our reinsurers."  Supp. app. at 1965.  It may be that 
the memorandum reflects a prediction that Crum & Forster's 
reinsurers would successfully defend against coverage of a 
settlement on the allocated costs issue.  CIGNA Re contends this 
memorandum betrays North River's belief that its obligation to 
pay defense costs was due entirely to its failure to schedule and 
its desire to avoid acknowledging this to its reinsurer.   
 As we have noted, the duty of good faith requires the 
reinsured to align its interests with those of the reinsurer.  We 
cannot say, as a matter of law, that, taken together, the 
September, 1988 letter and the January, 29, 1988 memorandum 
cannot show a breach of that duty.  But we also note that a Crum 
& Forster official testified that North River had been advised 
during mediation that Owens-Corning would not accept the 
arbitrator's compromise.  If Owens-Corning would not have 
accepted the settlement in any case, then CIGNA Re cannot 
establish the second prong of a breach of the duty of good faith:  
economic injury.  We agree with the district court that whether 
these circumstances establish a breach of the duty of good faith 
remains a disputed issue of fact. 
 4. 
 According to the district court, North River kept 
"CIGNA Re in the dark on key elements of [the arbitration] 
  
proceeding."32  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1148.  We do not 
believe the evidence presented raises an issue of bad faith. As 
we have noted, bad faith requires an extraordinary showing of a 
disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract.  The 
standard is not mere negligence, but gross negligence or 
recklessness.  Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1069.  In support of its 
finding, the district court noted that North River was late in 
providing CIGNA Re a complete copy of the arbitrator's thirty-one 
page opinion.  But after the arbitrator released his opinion, 
North River gave its reinsurers access to its files, which 
included a copy of the decision.  We do not believe North River's 
actions demonstrate gross negligence or reckless disregard of 
CIGNA Re's interests.   
 Furthermore, although North River did not provide CIGNA 
Re a full copy of the opinion, CIGNA Re was not prejudiced 
because it had already received a copy from another source 
shortly after the decision was announced.  As a matter of law, 
North River's behavior does not manifest disingenuous, dishonest, 
or grossly negligent conduct that caused economic harm to CIGNA 
Re. 
 5. 
                     
32
.  The district court did not base its grant of summary 
judgment to CIGNA Re on this failure to inform because it found 
that CIGNA Re had not suffered economic loss.  According to the 
district court, even had CIGNA Re been able to associate in the 
arbitration proceeding, it would not have changed the result 
because North River was bound to pay defense costs through its 
failure to schedule the policies properly. 
  
 Finally, the district court found that North River's 
conduct with respect to the appeal of the arbitration decision 
may have violated its duty of good faith.  North River, 831 F. 
Supp. at 1148.  But as the district court observed, "[t]he 
reinsurer has the burden of proving that the reinsured has not 
acted in good faith."  Id. at 1146.  Accordingly, CIGNA Re bore 
the burden of showing how North River's failure to apprise CIGNA 
Re of its abandonment of that appeal manifested gross negligence 
or recklessness, and how that failure caused CIGNA Re economic 
injury.  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1146 (citing Unigard III, 4 
F.3d at 1068-69).  The Wellington Agreement provided for an 
appeal process and required the Facility to maintain a list of 
appellate judges approved by the initial subscribers.  Wellington 
Agreement Appendix C ¶ 11.3.  In the event a party filed a notice 
of appeal, the Agreement provided a procedure for selecting a 
panel of three judges from the list.  Id. Appendix C ¶¶ 11.4-
11.6.  The standard for reversal on appellate review under 
Wellington was clearly erroneous.  Wellington Agreement Appendix 
C ¶ 100.2.   
 We believe North River had little chance of prevailing 
on appeal and we find no bad faith here.33  In light of the 
                     
33
.  The district court also found that North River's failure to 
schedule the policies made a successful appeal unlikely.  North 
River, 831 F. Supp. at 1148.  The district court came to that 
conclusion, however, because it found the arbitrator's decision 
was based on the Wellington schedules.  As noted, we disagree 
with that finding.  See supra part III.B.  We believe the 
arbitrator's decision was based on his interpretation of the 
underlying policy and we believe an appellate panel would have 
affirmed the arbitrator's decision on that basis as well. 
  
unlikelihood of success, North River's decision to forego an 
appeal cannot be characterized as reckless or grossly negligent.  
Furthermore, we agree with the district court that because of the 
unlikelihood of success on appeal, CIGNA Re could not establish 
the economic prejudice that forms the second prong of a claim of 
bad faith.   North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1148.  As a matter of 
law, we find North River's decision to forego the appeal cannot 
be characterized as reckless or grossly negligent and does not 
manifest bad faith. 
 V. 
 The district court also rejected North River's argument 
that the "following form" clause in the reinsurance certificates 
required CIGNA Re to pay the defense costs involving the Owens-
Corning policies.  In its summary judgment brief North River had 
contended that the "following form" clause also bound CIGNA Re to 
the terms of the underlying policy and that because the 
arbitrator held the terms of the underlying policies required 
North River to pay defense costs in addition to policy limits, 
CIGNA Re was likewise bound.  The district court rejected this 
contention on two bases:  First, the court held that CIGNA Re was 
not bound by the arbitrator's decision because the reinsurer had 
not been a signatory to Wellington.  Second, the court believed 
the arbitrator relied on the Wellington Agreement, and not on the 
underlying policies, in requiring payment of defense costs.  We 
disagree.34 
                     
34
.  North River has not addressed the "following forms" issue in 
its appeal.  Because we have found CIGNA Re bound to cover North 
  
 Arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution, 
especially in the insurance industry,35 and it would thwart that 
sound policy to treat arbitration outcomes differently from 
litigation judgments or settlement agreements for reinsurance 
purposes.  Accordingly, the fact that the insurer and its insured 
agreed to arbitrate disputes after the reinsurance certificate 
was issued cannot suspend operation of the "following forms" 
clause in the certificate.36  We also disagree with the district 
court's conclusion that the arbitrator did not rely on the 
(..continued) 
River's payment of defense costs under the "follow the fortunes" 
clause, we need not decide whether the reinsurer is also bound by 
the "following forms" clause.  Accordingly, we will not address 
the merits of the district court's "following forms" analysis.   
     In disposing of the summary judgment motions, the district 
court also rejected North River's arguments of waiver and 
estoppel.  Because North River has not appealed those decisions, 
we will not review them. 
35
.  See, e.g., Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A. 
Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 
1993) ("Federal policy, as embodied in the Federal Arbitration 
Act, strongly favors arbitration as an alternative dispute 
resolution process."); Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. 
Co. of America, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. 1975) ("It is always 
useful to bear in mind that the announced policy of this State 
favors and encourages arbitration as a means of conserving the 
time and resources of the courts and the contracting parties.").   
36
.  The district court's reliance on Unigard III is misplaced.  
The court cited Unigard III's holding that an arbitration result 
did not alter the terms of the bargained for agreement.  North 
River, 831 F. Supp. at 1150 (citing Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1071).  
But that language referred only to the narrow question of whether 
the reinsurer was liable to follow the arbitrator's decision 
ordering payments that exceeded express limits of the reinsurance 
certificate.  The Second Circuit held that the arbitrator's 
decision could not nullify express limits written into the 
reinsurance certificate, but the court did not say that the 
arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was otherwise 
without effect.  Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1071. 
  
underlying policies in ordering coverage of Owens-Corning's 
defense costs.  As noted, see part III.C. supra, the arbitrator 
analyzed the underlying policy at length and concluded that it 
did not exclude coverage of defense costs. 
   VI.  
 CIGNA Re cross-appeals the district court's denial of 
its motion for reconsideration of the court's order to include, 
as an alternative basis for summary judgment, that the 
reinsurance certificates cap CIGNA Re's liability to the limit 
stated in the certificates.37  Throughout the district court 
proceedings CIGNA Re repeatedly disavowed this argument.  The 
district court issued its summary judgment order without 
addressing the limits issue because it found, "CIGNA Re has never 
raised this defense."  North River, 831 F. Supp. at 1142.  CIGNA 
Re then filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e), which provides, "A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment."38   
                     
37
.  At the same time that it filed its motion for 
reconsideration, CIGNA Re also filed a motion to amend judgment 
because of errors.  The district court corrected the errors, but 
denied the motion for reconsideration. 
38
.  CIGNA Re also sought reargument under Rule 12(I) of the 
General Rules of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, which provides, 
 
 A motion for reargument shall be served and 
filed within 10 days after the entry of the 
order or judgment on the original motion by 
the Judge or Magistrate Judge.  There shall 
be served with the notice a brief setting 
forth concisely the matters or controlling 
  
 A proper motion to alter or amend judgment "must rely 
on one of three major grounds: `(1) an intervening change in 
controlling law;  (2) the availability of new evidence [not 
available previously]; [or] (3) the need to correct clear error 
[of law] or prevent manifest injustice.'"  Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 705 F. 
Supp. 698, 702 (D.D.C.) (quoting All Hawaii Tours, Corp. v. 
Polynesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 649 (D. Haw. 1987), 
rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1988)), vacated on 
other grounds, 707 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1989).  CIGNA Re contended 
Unigard III presented an intervening change in controlling law, 
but the district court denied the motion.  North River Ins. Co. 
v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, No. 91-1323, slip op. at 6-7.  
(D.N.J. November 15, 1993).    
 Generally, the denial of a motion for reconsideration 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Koshatka v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  However, 
"[b]ecause an appeal from a denial of a Motion for 
Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for review, the 
standard of review varies with the nature of the underlying 
judgment."  McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 
(..continued) 
decisions which counsel believes the Judge or 
Magistrate Judge has overlooked.  No oral 
argument shall be heard unless the Judge or 
Magistrate Judge grants the motion and 
specifically directs that the matter shall be 
reargued orally. 
  
F.2d 345, 348-49 (3d Cir. 1986)).  Where there is a mixed 
question of law and fact, "the reviewing court should separate 
the issue into its respective parts, applying the clearly 
erroneous test to the factual component, the plenary standard to 
the legal."  Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 
F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984).   
 CIGNA Re's appeal of the denial of its motion raises 
two issues:  first, whether the district court properly found 
that CIGNA Re had failed to raise the indemnity limits defense;  
and second, whether, despite a failure to raise the defense, the 
Second Circuit's decision in Unigard III represented an 
intervening change in controlling law sufficient to warrant grant 
of a motion for reconsideration.  We will apply a "clearly 
erroneous" standard to the first question and plenary review to 
the second.39    
 In March, 1992, CIGNA Re urged the district court to 
deny North River discovery on the indemnity cap issue, saying, 
"We are not defending this case on that basis."  App. at 1011.  
Thereafter, while it was considering the summary judgment 
                     
39
.  In conducting plenary review over the second question, 
however, we are mindful that ordinarily, under law of the case 
doctrine, we will "refuse to consider issues that are raised for 
the first time on appeal."  Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d 
Cir. 1976)).  Nevertheless, where "a previously ignored legal 
theory takes on new importance due to an intervening development 
in the law, it is appropriate . . . to exercise . . . discretion 
to allow a party to revive that theory."  Id.  We note that this 
standard is substantially the same as that governing disposition 
of a motion for reconsideration. 
  
motions, the district court invited CIGNA Re to address this 
issue.  Nevertheless, CIGNA Re declined.  In a letter to the 
district court, dated September 9, 1993, (which was eleven days 
before the summary judgment opinion was filed), CIGNA Re wrote: 
 CIGNA Re does not take the position that it 
could never have an obligation in excess of 
its certificate limits.  According to 
industry practice, and according to the law 
as CIGNA Re understands it . . ., CIGNA Re 
could have an obligation for expense in 
excess of its certificate limits -- if the 
reinsured policy, when issued, had an 
obligation to pay defense [costs] in excess 
of its limit.  The contractual problem in 
this case is not the certificate limits per 
se, but rather the fact that the policies as 
originally issued and reinsured had no 
defense obligation. 
(Letter from Thomas A. Allen to the district court of Sept. 9, 
1993, at 1-2), reprinted in app. at 934-35. 
 Later, in the course of a September 16, 1993, 
conference call, CIGNA Re advised the court that it was 
considering applying for leave to raise the defense after all, in 
light of the Second Circuit's decision in Unigard III.  The 
district court, however, informed counsel that it was not going 
to entertain further briefing and issued its summary judgment 
order on September 20, 1993, without addressing the indemnity 
limits issue.  Because the record supports the court's conclusion 
that CIGNA Re failed to raise the indemnity cap defense, it was 
not "clearly erroneous" and we will affirm the finding.  
 CIGNA Re also argues that the Second Circuit's decision 
in Unigard III represents an intervening change in controlling 
law, warranting reconsideration of the district court's summary 
  
judgment.  See Natural Resources Defense Council, 705 F. Supp. at 
702.  CIGNA Re explains that it failed to raise the indemnity 
limits defense because it believed Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), in 
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the 
reinsurer not liable for defense costs above caps stated in the 
reinsurance certificates, would be limited to its specific facts.  
CIGNA Re then vaults its analysis into a rule of law, asserting 
that without Unigard III, Bellefonte would have been so limited.  
We do not find that Unigard III represents a significant 
development from the Bellefonte rule.  
 In Bellefonte, A.H. Robbins Co. had sued its primary 
and excess insurer, Aetna, for defense costs Robbins incurred 
defending against personal injury claims involving the Dalkon 
Shield intra-uterine device.  After Aetna settled the litigation 
for an amount "substantially in excess" of the cap stated in its 
policies, Aetna sought indemnity from its reinsurers for a 
portion of the overage.  Bellefonte, 903 F.2d at 911.  The 
reinsurers agreed to indemnify Aetna to the limit stated in their 
reinsurance certificates, but refused to pay any additional 
costs.  Id.  
 After the reinsurers sought a declaratory judgment 
limiting their liability, Aetna counterclaimed for a declaratory 
judgment that its reinsurers had to "follow the fortunes" and 
cover all costs.  The district court awarded summary judgment to 
the six reinsurers.  Thus, the issue on appeal was "whether the 
reinsurers [were] obligated to Aetna for an amount greater than 
  
the amounts stated in the reinsurance certificates."  Id. at 912.  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "follow the 
fortunes" doctrine could not override a reinsurance certificate's 
express indemnity limit, reasoning that to do so "would strip the 
limitation clause and other conditions of all meaning; the 
reinsurer would be obliged merely to reimburse the insurer for 
any and all funds paid."  Id. at 913. 
 CIGNA Re rejected the indemnity cap theory throughout 
discovery because, it claims, it reasonably believed courts would 
restrict Bellefonte to its unique facts.  But the Second Circuit 
did not indicate that Bellefonte would be limited to its facts.  
And, of course, subsequently, in Unigard III, that court did not 
limit Bellefonte.  In Unigard III, the Second Circuit considered 
a "follow the fortunes" clause virtually identical to that in 
Bellefonte.  What is especially significant is that the court 
expressly adopted the reasoning of Bellefonte, holding, "'[T]he 
limitation on liability provision capped the reinsurers' 
liability under the [Certificate].  All other contractual 
language must be construed in light of that cap.'"  Unigard III, 
4 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Bellefonte, 903 F.2d at 914).   
 Clearly, CIGNA Re's restrictive view of Bellefonte is 
not dispositive here.  In Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d Cir. 1990), this court 
considered a claim raised for the first time on appeal because, 
without the teaching of the intervening case, the party had been 
"quite reasonable in believing" the new claim would have added 
little to its cause.  But we cannot say that CIGNA Re was "quite 
  
reasonable in believing" that it could not rely on Bellefonte on 
this issue.40  Thus, contrary to CIGNA Re's claim that Unigard 
III is a significant development in reinsurance law, we find the 
decision expressly follows Bellefonte.  Accordingly, we deny 
CIGNA Re's request that the merits of its certificate limits 
defense be addressed.   
 VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the summary 
judgment granted to CIGNA Re.  We cannot say that defense costs 
were outside the scope of coverage provided under the reinsurance 
certificates and we will not relieve CIGNA Re of its obligation 
to "follow the fortunes" of North River on that basis.  We will 
reverse the district court's finding that North River, as a 
matter of law, violated its duty of good faith to CIGNA Re.  And 
we will reverse the denial of summary judgment to North River on 
all points except whether North River, by failing to schedule its 
policies and by rejecting the settlement proposal, breached its 
duty of good faith to CIGNA Re.  We will affirm the district 
court's denial of CIGNA Re's motion for reconsideration. 
                         
                     
40
.  To bolster its theory that before Unigard III other courts 
would have restricted Bellefonte to its facts, CIGNA Re cites an 
article by Deborah Cohen, Aetna's attorney in Bellefonte.  See 
Deborah F. Cohen, The Bellefonte Decision and the "Follow the 
Fortunes" Doctrine, Mealey's Litigation Reports (Reinsurance), 
Dec. 6, 1990, at 24, 29.  Although the article makes a case for 
limiting Bellefonte, we do not find that it was "quite 
reasonable" for a party to rely on the writings of an interested 
attorney in light of the clear language of Bellefonte. 
